The Worldview of Atheism

If a Christian is to defend truth against atheism, he needs to know what atheism is. The term itself simply means a lack of belief in God. But we need a little more than that. Atheists, especially in our time and place, fall into recognizable patterns of thinking about certain issues. What are these patterns of thinking?

To understand atheistic philosophy, we need to understand what the three main branches of philosophy are. The first main branch of philosophy is called metaphysics. Metaphysics is the study of being or existence, what is real and what is possible. Common subjects that fall under metaphysics are God, angels, human nature, creation, evolution, and philosophy of science. 

The second main branch of philosophy is called epistemology. Epistemology is the study of knowledge, what we know and how we know certain things. Common subjects that fall under epistemology are belief, certainty, doubt, faith, reason, and sense perception. 

The third main branch of philosophy is called ethics. Ethics is the study of value, what is right and wrong, and what is good and evil. Common subjects that fall under ethics are friendship, justice, law, marriage, politics, and war. 

Many, if not most, atheists have predictable approaches in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. 

The most common atheistic metaphysic is naturalism or materialism. Atheists commonly believe that matter, or physical nature, is all that exists. Charles Hodge says that “materialism … ignores the distinction between matter and mind, and refers all the phenomena of the world, whether physical, vital, or mental, to the functions of matter” (Hodge, p. 246).

Perhaps the main culprit, when it comes to modern naturalism, is Charles Darwin. Darwin was an English 19th century scientist and author of On the Origin of Species and The Descent of Man. He is one of the most influential proponents of the theory that life came about through random mutation and natural selection, without any intelligent mind or divine being involved in the process whatsoever. Frederick Copleston says that “while [Darwin] could not look on the universe as a product of blind chance, he could see no evidence of design, still less of beneficent design, when he came to consider the details of natural history” (Copleston, Volume VIII, p. 103).

Another prominent proponent of naturalism is Thomas Huxley, one of the first Darwinists. Huxley argued that consciousness was simply a function of the brain (Copleston, Volume VIII, p. 106). In other words, once matter in the brain is organized in a certain way, consciousness arises. For Huxley, “all known effects are ascribed to material causes. Spirit is declared to have only imaginary existence” (Hodge, p. 272).

The most common atheistic epistemology is positivism. Positivism claims that only what can be observed and verified by the senses is true, genuine knowledge. All knowledge is based on sense-experience. The name “positivism” comes from the fact that positivists restricted genuine knowledge to so-called “positive” sciences such as physics, chemistry, and biology. Hodge describes the Positive Philosophy this way: “There is no mind distinct from matter; no such thing as efficiency; no causes, whether first or final; no God; no future state of existence for man. Theology and psychology are, therefore, banished from the domain of science” (Hodge, p. 254).

The founder of positivism is Auguste Comte. Comte was a French 19th century philosopher and author of Course of Positive Philosophy, System of Positive Policy, and Positivist Catechism. For Comte, “only what can stand up to empirical testing can count as knowledge” (Copleston, Volume IX, p. 77). In positivism, “the search for absolutes is abandoned. Even if there are ultimate causes, we cannot know them. What we know are phenomena. Hence the mind which appreciates the nature and function of positive knowledge will not waste time in profitless theological and metaphysical speculation” (Copleston, Volume IX, p. 80).

Hodge argues that Comte’s philosophy is based on a denial of self-evident intuitive truths. For Hodge, we intuitively recognize that we are free agents, that there is a specific, essential difference between right and wrong, that every effect has an efficient cause, that we are responsible to God, and that Jesus Christ is the Son of God (Hodge, pp. 259, 260). But, of course, Comte denies all of these. 

It’s important to note that, technically speaking, positivism doesn’t prescribe theism or atheism. However, since the existence of God cannot be empirically tested, we cannot come to any certain knowledge of his existence. So, practically speaking, atheism is the result. 

Other thinkers who show elements of positivist thinking include Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, John Tyndall, and Bertrand Russell. 

• According to Hobbes, “theology, if offered as a science or coherent body of true propositions, is absurd and irrational” (Copleston, Volume V, p. 6). 

• For Hume, “in the long run, the world is an inscrutable mystery, and we cannot have any certain knowledge of ultimate causes” (Copleston, Volume V, p. 310).

• Tyndall argued that “as far as knowledge is concerned, science is omnicompetent. Problems which cannot be answered by science are unanswerable in principle” (Copleston, Volume VIII, p. 109).

• Russell maintained that “science … is the only source of what can reasonably be called definite knowledge” (Copleston, Volume VIII, p. 489).

The most common atheistic ethic is consequentialism or utilitarianism. The definition of these terms is largely contained in the words themselves. A consequentialist focuses most on the consequences of certain actions to determine whether those actions are right or wrong. A utilitarian focuses on the utility or usefulness of certain actions to determine whether those actions are right or wrong. There are slight differences in the meanings of consequentialism and utilitarianism, but both affirm that the key to moral judgments is ascertaining the greatest good for the greatest number of people. It should be noted that while many atheists are consequentialists, there are many consequentialists who are theists, including the founder of consequentialism, Jeremy Bentham.

Bentham was an English 18th and 19th century philosopher. He authored An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Bentham assumed “that every human being seeks by nature to attain pleasure and avoid pain” (Copleston, Volume VIII, p. 8). An action is right if it increases the sum total of pleasure; an action is wrong if it increases the sum total of pain. This is called the principle of utility (p. 9). Bentham also believed that even those who weren’t utilitarians tacitly appealed to the principle of utility in their ethical judgments. 

Consequentialism has seen wide influence. One of its main proponents is John Stuart Mill. Mill argues “that happiness is not merely a good but the good: it is the one ultimate end which all desire and seek” (p. 29). However, one problem Mill recognized with Benthamism was that it only considered pleasure to be a good. Thus, Benthamism is incapable of saying that certain pleasures are better or worse than others. Some standard other than pleasure is needed to make that claim. Put another way, “it makes little sense to say that the pleasure of listening to Beethoven is qualitatively superior to the pleasure of smoking opium, unless we take into account considerations other than that of pleasure itself” (p. 30).

The Founding Fathers often show a consequentialist strain:

• Benjamin Franklin argued that ethics should be given a utilitarian instead of a theological basis, since Scripture had no weight for him. “Virtues such as temperance and diligence are justified by their utility” (Copleston, Volume VIII, p. 258).

• Thomas Jefferson firmly believed in a moral sense, and that this moral sense was based on the principle of utility. For him, “nature has constituted utility to man the standard and best of virtue” (Jefferson, pp. 27, 28).

• John Adams maintained “that the happiness of society is the end of government, as all divines and moral philosophers will agree that the happiness of the individual is the end of man. From this principle it will follow, that the form of government, which communicates ease, comfort, security, or in one word happiness to the greatest number of persons, and in the greatest degree, is the best” (J Adams, p. 173).

• Samuel Adams compares our moral judgments to God’s: “The Author of Nature directs all his operations to the production of the greatest good, and has made human virtue to consist in a disposition and conduct which tends to the common felicity of his creatures” (S Adams, p. 117).

What are the consequences of naturalism, positivism, and consequentialism for the Christian faith? In sum, naturalism entails that God, the angelic realm, and the human soul do not and cannot exist. Positivism entails that God cannot be known. Consequentialism entails that human values determine our purpose and that human beings are competent enough to guide the future with their moral actions.

References

Adams, John (“Thoughts on Government”); Adams, Samuel (“American Independence”). The Constitution of the United States of America and Selected Writings of the Founding Fathers. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble (2012).

Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy: Volumes V, VIII, IX. Westminster, MD: The Newman Press (1959, 1966, 1974).

Hodge, Charles. Systematic Theology: Volume I. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers (2020).

Jefferson, Thomas. Democracy. Birmingham, AL: Palladium Press (2002).

Philosophy as Preparation for Faith

The story of the thief on the cross demonstrates that winsome apologetics, sound philosophy, and robust theology are not necessary agents to bring someone to saving faith in Christ. Yet, it is true that certain philosophical paradigms make it harder for someone to recognize the truth of Christian theism, while other paradigms make it easier for someone to recognize the truth. What do I mean by this?

Each culture has certain background assumptions. These assumptions can include anything from “Supernatural explanations are inherently suspect” to “Each human being is equal in worth.” These assumptions can gain sway for a myriad of reasons; the geography, the press, the schools, the arts, etc., of a particular culture can all influence the assumptions of a culture.

For example, we live in a sexually promiscuous culture, here in the United States. It can fairly be said that influential thinkers (Freud, Kinsey), widespread materialistic sex education in public schools, the capabilities of the internet, the capacity for birth control, and the glorification of sex and beauty in film, among other factors, all interact with each other and help produce the sexually promiscuous culture we experience today. And a sexually promiscuous culture reacts and responds to the Bible differently than a sexually chaste culture would, even if both have a majority of unsaved people. A sexually promiscuous culture has a tough time accepting pretty much any biblical command regarding sexual ethics, but particularly those that encourage modesty, fidelity, and heterosexuality.

My overall point is not about sex though. The paradigm of materialism in the West provides another stumbling block for those who hear the gospel. Claims of divinity are inherently suspect or even repulsive to many Westerners. My overall point is that certain paradigms more readily and comprehensively “choke the word” of the gospel, and therefore Christians should promote paradigms of thinking in their homes, churches, and schools that permeate the culture with better background assumptions, while at the same time not backing down at all in the frequency and intensity of straightforward preaching and gospel presentation.

For example, the paradigm of Platonism is much more conducive to the acceptance of Christian truth than the paradigms that dominate today. Plato argued that the universe is designed, that the material world does not give us the highest goods, that eternal truths exist, that genuine happiness comes from pursuing the Good, etc. Platonism was one of the dominant paradigms in the culture where the early church began. As a result, the existence of God and the capacity for truth and virtue were quite readily accepted by many people. Frederick Copleston says as much regarding the church fathers: “Hellenic philosophy they tended to regard as a propaedeutic to Christianity, so that their main interest in treating of it was to point out the anticipation of Christian truth which they saw therein contained and the aberrations from truth which were also clear to them” (Volume II, p. 38).

Furthermore, as Copleston also shows, it is clear that philosophy helped prepare St. Augustine for the Christian faith. Since Augustine is perhaps the most influential theologian in history, this should not be taken lightly. “In other words, the function of neo-Platonism at this period was to render it possible for Augustine to see the reasonableness of Christianity, and he began to read the New Testament again, particularly the writings of St. Paul” (Volume II, p. 43). Obviously, Christ is the center of Augustine’s thinking, but this doesn’t negate the fact that Platonism helped give him categories to accept and understand Christ: “His reading of neo-Platonic works was an instrument in the intellectual conversion of Augustine, while his moral conversion, from the human viewpoint, was prepared by the sermons of Ambrose and the words of Simplicianus and Pontitianus, and confirmed and sealed by the New Testament” (Volume II, p. 43). If Augustine hadn’t had this philosophical preparation, he would have likely come to faith more slowly and with more difficulty. And I’d like to stress here that this doesn’t contradict at all the reality that God is the sole, sovereign agent in regenerating a fallen person’s heart. As Paul or Copleston might say, I speak in a human way from a human point of view.

Augustine is not unique in this matter. 20th century American philosopher Mortimer J Adler, by his own testimony, asserts that a proper understanding of the role of philosophy and theology in the acquisition of knowledge, as well as a confidence in the demonstration of the existence of God, constituted a preamble to his Christian faith (Rearview Mirror, p. 270). Again, because salvation depends ultimately on God, it is completely possible to be saved without having a solid philosophical paradigm beforehand (many true Christians don’t). But the background assumptions of Thomism and Aristotelianism helped Adler in his acceptance of Christian truth. And, arguably, if there were more like Adler writing and teaching in the world, then some stumbling blocks would be removed for many people before they came to faith. To put it simply, a prevalence of bad thinking makes it harder to accept good thinking. I hasten to add that the gospel isn’t merely good thinking. The gospel is a message that is supposed to penetrate our minds, our hearts, and our wills. But good philosophical thinking would be a much healthier preparation for this message than poor philosophical thinking.

Professor Carl Trueman eloquently makes a similar argument in his discussion of the “social imaginary.” Borrowing from Charles Taylor, Trueman defines the social imaginary as “the myriad beliefs, practices, normative expectations, and even implicit assumptions that members of a society share and that shape their daily lives. It is not so much a conscious philosophy of life as a set of intuitions and practices” (Modern Self, p. 37). I’ll tie this in with my overall point: the social imaginary is roughly equivalent to the background assumptions I’ve mentioned above. The social imaginary of Ancient Greece was heavily influenced by Platonism. As a result, certain truths of Christian theism came more readily to pagans. The social imaginary of 21st century America is heavily influenced by Darwinism, Marxism, nihilism, and relativism. As a result, many truths of Christian theism are strange or repulsive to modern pagans. Most Ancient Greeks were not scholars of Plato, and neither are most modern Americans scholars of Darwin, Marx, and Freud. However, in Ancient Greece, Platonism was influential enough such that even those who had never read Plato were naturally inclined to the background assumptions of Platonism. And, in modern America, Darwinism, Marxism, etc. are influential enough such that even those who have never read Darwin or Marx are naturally inclined to the background assumptions of these philosophies.

Christians less inclined to philosophy may scoff at the idea of putting effort into philosophical preparation to faith, since men like Augustine and Adler are exceptions. Indeed, they are exceptions. But we should still pursue philosophical preparation for at least two reasons: (1) We should all want bright thinkers on the side of truth. And robust philosophical preparation helps such thinkers come to a saving faith. (2) Bright, exceptional thinkers are often the most influential. They, in turn, help create the social imaginary that guides the rest of the masses. If you can win over an Augustine, an Adler, a C S Lewis, or an Edward Feser with the assistance of philosophical training, then they in turn may influence the good thinking and ultimate conversion of thousands or millions of people.

Am I arguing for a return to Platonism or Aristotelianism? No. But I am arguing that Christians should eagerly take whatever good philosophical thinking they can find from Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, etc. Christians should be the best philosophers, and good philosophical thinking helps defeat bad philosophical thinking. When the likes of Hume, Kant, or Darwin come around, at least some Christians should have the philosophical tools to spar with them. The Bible is our only infallible guide, and the Bible should inform all spheres of our thinking. But we should also readily take advantage of any good we can find from bright, insightful thinkers. Doing so may just help win souls to Christ.

References

Christian Standard Bible. Nashville, TN: Holman Bible Publishers (2017).

Adler, Mortimer J. A Second Look in the Rearview Mirror. New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing (1992).

Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy: Volume II. Westminster, MD: The Newman Press (1950).

Trueman, Carl. The Rise and Triumph of the Modern Self. Wheaton, IL: Crossway (2020).

The Moral Law

God’s relation to moral norms has been one of the primary concerns of moral philosophy. Yet perspectives on this issue have varied widely. On the one hand, there are those who claim that God is bound by a moral law distinct from himself. On the other hand, there are those who argue that the moral law is freely determined by the will of God. Moreover, some believe the moral law is best explained by God and is sufficiently explained only if God is behind it, while others remove God from the picture entirely and hold that God is unnecessary for effective moral thinking. My aim is to analyze some of these perspectives and, if any of them prove true, to defend them. Because I am a Christian, I will be arguing from not only a philosophical basis, but also from a theological basis. Therefore, I hope to defend the moral framework that adheres to sound argument as well as to sacred Scripture. On my analysis, this moral framework is best found in the philosophies of both St. Augustine of Hippo and St. Thomas Aquinas, as we shall see. But, I shall show that even thinkers with which I disagree shed light on important issues regarding the moral law and how God relates to it.

The famous Euthyphro Dilemma gives us a good place to start. Plato’s Euthyphro hinges on a question central to this paper: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” (Plato, p. 130). While Euthyphro attempts to resolve the dilemma, he, in the end, claims that “what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious” (p. 128). What are the implications of this? Well, hypothetically God could command anything and it would be morally right because all that matters is whether God wills it. For instance, by this reasoning, the commands against murder and adultery in the Ten Commandments are morally right solely because God wills it so. This seems to be a precarious position. Is there an alternative? We can assume instead that God adheres to certain principles because they are right. Is there anything wrong with this? Potentially. If God adheres to moral principles outside himself, is he really the ultimate authority? Is he truly sovereign? A sober-minded theist may tremble a bit at this dilemma. Neither of these positions appear to be satisfactory. However, while the Euthyphro Dilemma is perhaps an important concept to wrestle with, it does not circumscribe the nature of morality and how it relates to God. For instance, there is a substantive difference between the will of God and the character of God. This will be developed soon. For now, let’s look in more detail at Plato’s moral philosophy. 

Ethics, according to Plato, “is directed toward the attainment of man’s highest good, in the possession of which true happiness consists” (Copleston, Volume I, p. 216). For Plato, man’s happiness and the Good are inseparably linked. This notion is promoted by the psalmist as well. “Light is sown for the righteous, and joy for the upright in heart” (Psalm 97:11). The attainment of the highest good, at a basic level, entails the development of one’s soul, moral personality, and general well-being. Indeed, for Plato, man’s happiness involves knowledge of and reflection of God. Thus, since the source of man’s happiness is equivalent to man’s highest good, it readily follows that God is the Good in Plato’s philosophy. “Plato declares that ‘God is the measure of all things, in a sense far higher than any man, as they say, can ever hope to be’” (Volume I, p. 218, Laws). What does “God” mean for Plato though? Well, “atheism,” is the denial of “the operation of Reason in the world” (Volume I, p. 191, Timaeus). So it seems reasonable to claim that “God” is equivalent to some form of “Divine Reason.” But, it cannot be confidently asserted that, for Plato, the Forms inhere the Divine Reason. Why is this important? Because the preeminent Form is the Form of the Good. 

Thus, it is apparent that, in Plato’s philosophy, a moral law exists outside of God. For him, God loves certain things and is a certain way because he adheres to a moral law (i.e. the Forms) outside himself. If this interpretation is correct, then it is arguably at odds with a biblical notion of God’s sovereignty and and at odds with verses in Scripture that imply God’s very character and essence to be the source of truth and goodness. “Jesus said to him, ‘I am the way, and the truth, and the life’” (John 14:6). “But the Lord is the true God; he is the living God and the everlasting King” (Jer. 10:10). “‘But when the Helper comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father, he will bear witness about me’” (John 15:26). “And we know that the Son of God has come and has given us understanding, so that we may know him who is true; and we are in him who is true, in his Son Jesus Christ. He is the true God and eternal life” (1 John 5:20). “The sum of your word is truth, and every one of your righteous rules endures forever” (Psalm 119:160).

St. Augustine, although himself a Neo-Platonist, differs from Plato on the issue of God and the moral law. Like Plato, Augustine argues that ultimate happiness “can be found only in the possession of the immutable Good, God” (Copleston, Volume II, p. 83). “Let your priests, O Lord God, be clothed with salvation, and let your saints rejoice in your goodness” (2 Chr. 6:41). However, Augustine also holds that the eternal law of God is by no means an arbitrary set of principles but rather a moral law founded on “the Nature of God and the relationship of man to God” (II, p. 83). St. Aquinas similarly claims that the moral law is “ultimately founded on the divine essence itself and so cannot change” (II, p. 410). This is also true of the natural law, which is derived from the moral law. The natural law is rooted in human nature so “it follows that it cannot be changed, since human nature remains fundamentally the same” (II, p. 407, Theologiae). From this, we can conclude that the moral law is not separate from God. This answers the first clause of the Euthyphro Dilemma. Additionally, God wills the moral law, but not arbitrarily, because his will is consistent with his character, which cannot change. This answers the second clause. Thus, we see that an emphasis on God’s character as the source of the moral law provides a ready solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma. Moreover, both Augustine’s and Aquinas’ beliefs in this regard are clearly aligned with Scripture. “The law of the Lord is perfect, reviving the soul … the precepts of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart … the rules of the Lord are true, and righteous altogether” (Psalm 19:7, 8, 9). 

Two other medieval philosophers give us an alternative to the Augustinian and Thomistic perspectives. John Duns Scotus asserts that the moral law is founded on the will of God rather than the essence of God. But Scotus would add that “what God wills is good because God of His very nature cannot will anything but what is good” (Copleston, Volume II, p. 547). Scotus essentially claims that while the moral law is dependent on God’s will alone, we can be sure that God will not command anything evil because his nature precludes it. To a skeptic, this may seem like a weak escape from the Euthyphro Dilemma. William of Ockham went even further than Scotus. Ockham argues that the entire moral law is “wholly contingent … its essence and character depend on the divine creative and omnipotent will” (Copleston, Volume III, p. 104). The moral law is ultimately derived solely from God’s will, not his character. The result of this is that while God currently forbids adultery, adultery would become a right action if it were commanded by God. Thus, the general principle of Ockham’s moral thought is that some actions are evil because they are forbidden by God. This moral philosophy easily, if inadvertently, sets up the notion of an arbitrary God. Ockham’s moral philosophy seems to fall prey to the Euthyphro Dilemma because of its singular focus on the divine will rather than the divine essence. While Scotus gave a caveat to the freedom of God’s will, Ockham does no such thing. But what we see in Scripture is an unchanging expression of what is good and what is evil. “Beloved, do not imitate evil but imitate good. Whoever does good is from God; whoever does evil has not seen God” (3 John 1:11). “For I the Lord do not change” (Mal. 3:6).

Robert Adams offers a moral framework similar to that of Scotus, but in contemporary fashion. As a divine command theorist, Adams holds that the nature of morality is intrinsically tied to the will or commands of God. Consequently, if an action is wrong, this means that it is contrary to the commands of God. And if an action is obligatory, this implies that it is required by the commands of God. But Adams adds the caveat that these commands do not derive from an arbitrary God but from a loving God. “It is allowed by the theory to be logically possible for God to command cruelty for its own sake, although the believer is confident he will not do such a thing” (Adams, p. 135). But like Scotus’ framework, Adams’ moral framework does not appear to answer the Euthyphro Dilemma in a satisfactory way. Adams’ argument, one may object, essentially comes down to “God is not arbitrary because God is not arbitrary (because he’s loving).” Adams assumes that God is loving. This is an assertion with obvious scriptural warrant. But it is an assertion that doesn’t necessarily follow from his moral framework. Nevertheless, it is consistent with Scripture both that the commands of God are right and that God is loving. “Through your precepts I get understanding” (Psalm 119:104). “Beloved, let us love one another, for love is from God” (1 John 4:21).

I have briefly shown both the weakness of the Euthyphro Dilemma in expressing all there is to God and morality and the vulnerability of theistic moral frameworks that might fall prey to this dilemma. So, understandably, Kai Nielsen, an avowed atheist, draws ammunition from the Euthyphro Dilemma in his critique of theistic morality. Nielsen’s stance is clear: “There is no evidence whatsoever for the existence of God” (Nielsen, p. 100). Moreover, he has two main lines of attack directed at theistic morality. The first concerns authority. Nielsen presupposes early on that “if we do what we do simply because it has been authorized, we cannot be reasoning and acting as moral agents” (p. 53). Instead, we should autonomously establish our own moral principles and support these principles clearly and rationally. Nielsen argues that “simple commands or imperatives” (p. 74) do not necessarily lead to legitimate moral obligations. For example, a professor commanding a student to complete an assignment does not make the completion of an assignment a right act. In this sense, Nielsen is right. Simple commands or imperatives do not automatically lead to moral obligations. But the commands that issue from the mouth of a holy, righteous, and sovereign God cannot be called simple by any means. “By myself I have sworn; from my mouth has gone out in righteousness a word that shall not return: ‘To me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear allegiance’” (Isaiah 45:23). Furthermore, it must be said that commands that issue from fallen, imperfect, contingent human beings have next to no weight in comparison. The examples Nielsen gives do not do justice to the question. At the same time, however, Nielsen does pinpoint some of the flaws with an Adamsist or Ockhamist viewpoint that we’ve seen. Authority alone is not necessarily a reason to do something, particularly if said authority is not morally good. Yet true Christians realize that the divine authority whom we worship is morally good.

The second line of attack concerns the relation between morality and religion. Nielsen rightly ascertains that if the moral law is independent from God, then we do not need God for the moral law to be intelligible to us. In other words, God would judge his actions in accordance with the moral law just as we would. From this, Nielsen asserts that “we must … use our own moral insight to decide that God’s acts are good. … We cannot avoid using our own moral understanding … if we are ever to know that God is good” (p. 75). There is some truth here, but it is far from a slam dunk. First, the very moral insight we use to judge acts as right or wrong comes from God, for we are made in his image. “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them” (Gen. 1:27). What’s more, it is not as if God is utterly concealed until one reads Scripture. The Apostle Paul tells us that “his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world” (Rom. 1:20). Finally, God and his Word are in authority over us, not the opposite. As unholy creatures, we do not have the right to tell God where or when he could have done better. “But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, ‘Why have you made me like this?’” (Romans 9:20). Thus, while Nielsen says that “morality does not presuppose religion; religion presupposes morality” (p. 77), I would counter that the morality we use to presuppose religion itself has a religious significance since we, as human beings, image God.

Ultimately, Nielsen fails to engage with any Augustinian or Thomist perspective on God and his relation to the moral law. This proves to be his key weakness. If one considers the foundation of morality in light of God’s character, much of what Nielsen says simply falls apart; for he predominantly concerns himself, very broadly speaking, with the Platonist and Ockhamist moral frameworks, which have been shown to be vulnerable to criticism. What is Nielsen’s alternative then? He promotes the idea that “the overall rationale of moral rules is linked to achieving the maximum in human happiness and the minimum in human suffering” (p. 94). Why? According to a Christian worldview, human happiness certainly is valuable. But why should it be in a secular worldview? Especially a secular worldview like Nielsen’s who holds that “man was not made for anything” (p. 103). While I concede to Nielsen that it is very possible for secular people to be moral people (indeed, we rely on this to be the case when going about our everyday activities), the secular worldview in this case, or any case, lacks a sufficient basis to be moral.

I now turn to our final thinker for consideration: Mark C. Murphy. Murphy puts forward a moral framework called “moral concurrentism,” which says that “moral necessitation, and thus moral law, is immediately explained both by God and by creaturely natures” (Murphy, p. 148). Murphy frequently refers to Robert Adams as a fair starting point for a theistic moral framework, but he notes weak spots in Adams’ ideas. Murphy argues that Adams is right in claiming that “the goodness of creaturely goods consists in their resemblance to God” (p. 150), but adds that a thing’s excellence should not be solely determined by its resemblance to God but also by its “resemblance to … the kind to which the thing belongs” (p. 154). For example, Murphy humorously demonstrates that it is not good for the nature of a human being to taste “like a well-prepared chicken fried steak” (p. 159). This gets at the will vs. character issue I’ve continued to raise. It is not unlike Augustine’s accent on the essence of God and his relationship to us as the basis for the moral law. We follow God’s commands but not for the sake of following a hypothetically arbitrary deity’s precepts, but rather because we fear and love a God with a morally perfect nature, a God who we reflect due to our own nature.

Murphy develops his ideas on moral obligation and necessitation in light of the nature of God and man. “God alone is good without qualification” (p. 162), Murphy argues, but many things participate in the goodness of God. So, these lesser goods still “demand a response as participations in the divine goodness” (p. 162). This provides the foundation for moral obligation. For instance, humankind, made in God’s image, participates in God’s goodness and consequently has intrinsic moral worth. From these, moral principles such as “Murder is wrong” may easily follow. Murphy emphasizes that the goodness of the created order should not be “contrasted to the divine goodness” (165). Instead, love and benevolence shown toward creatures should, by extension, be seen to fundamentally be love and benevolence shown toward the Creator. Understandably then, Murphy, like Nielsen, maintains that raw authority may not intrinsically give a “decisive reason to perform [an] action” (p. 168). In other words, God commanding an action does not give us a good reason to do that action if God is not the source of moral goodness but is actually morally evil. But again, Christians realize that God is unable, by his very nature, to commit moral evil. “The Rock, his work is perfect, for all his ways are justice. A God of faithfulness and without iniquity, just and upright is he” (Deut. 32:4). 

At this point, one may object that the solutions offered by Augustine, Aquinas, and Murphy possibly leave a critical problem unsolved. What is this problem? It is the second order Euthyphro Dilemma. Up until now, most of our attention has been focused on the first order dilemma. The second order dilemma asks this question: is God’s nature good because it is God’s nature or is God’s nature good because it adheres to some other standard? Two things may be said here. 1) God is the highest, most perfect, most holy standard for all creation. “For thus says the One who is high and lifted up, who inhabits eternity, whose name is Holy: ‘I dwell in the high and holy place’” (Is. 57:15). “‘Who is like you, majestic in holiness, awesome in glorious deeds, doing wonders?’” (Ex. 15:11). “‘There is none holy like the Lord; there is none besides you; there is no rock like our God’” (1 Sam. 2:2). Scripture plainly precludes the possibility of any standard of perfection outside the great “I AM” (Ex. 3:14). 2) Creation’s understanding of what is good is founded on who God is. “And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good” (Gen. 1:31). Knowledge of God is linked to knowledge of goodness. “The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God.’ They are corrupt … there is none who does good” (Psalm 14:1). “I say to the Lord, ‘You are my Lord; I have no good apart from you’” (Psalm 16:2). “You are good and do good; teach me your statutes” (Psalm 119:68). Therefore, as creatures of a benevolent and powerful God, we depend on him for our comprehension of all things, including the moral law. All we can rightfully do is “tremble at the commandment of our God” (Ezra 10:3). 

So, what have we learned? We began with the Euthyphro Dilemma for the question it raises bears weight on several of the moral frameworks presented here. But, I have argued that the Dilemma really does not get at the heart of the issue of how God relates to the moral law, and it can be further argued that it puts forth an unbiblical dichotomy. This is because it is Scripturally sound both that 1) God commands us to do certain actions and have certain attitudes because they are right and that 2) the commands of God are themselves right. “I hasten and do not delay to keep your commandments. … At midnight I rise to praise you, because of your righteous rules” (Psalm 119:60, 62). It can further be said that even though the moral frameworks of Scotus and Ockham may have startling implications, Ockham’s goal especially was to “emphasize the divine omnipotence and liberty, not to encourage immorality” (Copleston, Volume III, p. 105). Moreover, even if one thinks that the Euthyphro Dilemma deserves a thorough answer, I have shown that a focus on God’s holy, righteous character provides that answer. In addition, it provides a rebuttal to Nielsen’s critique of theistic morality. This solution, the stress on the character of God, is held most vigorously and persuasively by two titans of Christian theology and philosophy: Augustine and Aquinas. But you see very similar thinking in the words of Mark C. Murphy. Therefore, while many philosophers have put forth defensible views on the relation between God and the moral law, it seems that those who have maintained the best views on the issue are firmly grounded in sound philosophical reasoning and in wise biblical exegesis. They are those who “ascribe to the Lord the glory due his name” (Psalm 29:2).

References

English Standard Version. Wheaton, IL: Crossway (2001).

Adams, Robert M. “A New Divine Command Theory.” Journal of Religious Ethics (Spring 1979). Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory. Edited by Sher, George. New York, NY: Routledge (2012).

Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy: Volumes I, Volume II, Volume III. Westminster, MD: The Newman Press (1946, 1950, 1953).

Murphy, Mark C. God & Moral Law. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (2011).

Nielsen, Kai. Ethics Without God: Revised Edition. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books (1990).

Plato. Euthyphro. Translated by G.M.A. Grube. Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory. Edited by Sher, George. New York, NY: Routledge (2012).

Darwinian Macroevolution

The theory of Darwinian macroevolution, the idea that natural selection and random mutation produced contemporary biodiversity, is a theory high on philosophical speculation and low on empirical evidence. Darwinists disagree of course. They say, among other things, that nature does not need a guiding hand, that nature can self-organize itself. They hold that the suffering and misery of this world provide an insurmountable obstacle to a belief in an intelligently designed universe sustained by the providence of God. They further hold that Darwinism is so far the best explanation for life’s origins and development that remains scientific. But this philosophy is erroneous and misguided. Blind nature cannot self-organize anything; if the blind lead the blind, they fall into a pit. Suffering and misery can be readily defined and explained in a theistic worldview. Moreover, the path of science and the path of truth do not always intersect. Darwinism is a weak worldview, but to present it in its best light, I will first describe what may be some of the more challenging arguments in favor of Darwinian macroevolution. Then, I will dissolve these arguments with good thinking and biblical reasoning. Let’s begin.

First, Darwinists claim that nature can have the same effect on an organism as the intentional decisions of an intelligent agent. This is perhaps the crux of Darwinian macroevolutionary theory. If nature cannot have the same effect as the decisions of a mind, then Darwinism loses a great deal of credibility. Jean-Baptiste Pierre Lamarck argues that “in response to new needs brought about by changes in the environment, changes take place in the organic structure of animals, some organs falling into disuse and others being evolved and developed, and that acquired habits are transmitted by heredity” (Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Volume VIII, p. 101). The wolves and bears of the world, for example, are made more adaptable to colder, snowier environments by changes in their fur color and density. Upon reading Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population, Charles Darwin similarly concludes that advantageous mutations are preserved, disadvantageous mutations are destroyed, and “that the result of this process is the formation of new species” (p. 102). But this is not controversial. Alfred Russell Wallace is also sympathetic to the “idea of the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence” (p. 102). Yet this still only gets us to microevolution; no one denies that fitter organisms survive, that fitter organisms succeed. What is controversial about Darwinism is that it asserts that the mutation/selection mechanism drove the history of life, not just speciation.

But is the history of life better explained by matter than by mind? Is Darwinism the best explanation for how the world works? Robert Wright certainly thinks so. One example is the concept of a universal human nature. “Darwinian anthropologists see the world’s undeniably diverse cultures as products of a single human nature responding to widely varying circumstances” (Robert Wright, The Moral Animal, p. 8). In Darwinian terms, we all possess the same human nature because we all originated from the same human ancestors, who in turn originated from a similar group of pre-human organisms, and so on. And the obvious differences we see between cultures and peoples can be attributed to environmental factors. Moreover, the reason we do not fully understand our minds is because natural selection “appears to have hidden our true selves from our conscious selves” (p. 10). And all those warm moral terms like compassion, empathy, and love actually have no eternal or metaphysical basis, but merely “a firm genetic basis” (p. 12). Indeed, Wright goes so far as to say that Darwinian macroevolutionary theory “is so powerful as to explain the nature of all living things” (p. 14). Sociologically speaking, Wright claims that the reason we seek status, value social esteem, and aim to be morally reputable and self-sufficient is that it helps us spread our genes (p. 313). “Genetic proliferation” is the ultimate end of all life (p. 317). The reason we are a “conflict between animal impulses” and social commitments is because we are actually animals with better developed social reasoning (p. 321). Thus, Darwinism would then explain anthropology, psychology, and sociology rather handily. But, of course, just because a theory can explain a certain set of data to a certain degree of satisfaction does not mean that it is the true explanation for that data.

Second, Darwinists argue that pain, suffering, and inefficiency do not square with a benevolent God. In Darwin’s eyes, “he [can] see no evidence of design, still less of beneficent design, when he [comes] to consider the details of natural history” (Copleston, Volume VIII, p. 103). In this context, Darwin’s objection is against Intelligent Design. But his statement broadly regards the problem of evil, which is often an objection against theism entirely (as demonstrated by Darwin’s agnosticism in later life). The problem is not new; it is discussed as early as Job: “Why is light given to one burdened with grief, and life to those whose existence is bitter, who wait for death, but it does not come” (3:20). Or Ecclesiastes: “There are righteous people who get what the actions of the wicked deserve, and there are wicked people who get what the actions of the righteous deserve” (8:14). Thus, the problem of evil seems to have two main prongs: 1) Why is there so much suffering in general? 2) Why are the good punished and the wicked rewarded? Wright draws attention to this toward the end of his book. “If God were benevolent and truly omnipotent, why couldn’t he invent a painless creative process?” (Wright, p. 331). He rejects the idea of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God for he later writes: “in a universe which for all we know is godless, one reasonable place to find moral guidance is utilitarianism” (p. 332).

Permutations of the problem of evil can be found throughout the history of philosophy. British philosopher David Hume “thought that religion impairs morality by encouraging people to act for motives other than love of virtue for its own sake” (Copleston, Volume V, p. 305). In other words, not only is evil inexplicable in a theistic universe, much evil is brought about by those who believe in a theistic universe. Indeed, some representatives of the French Enlightenment regarded Christianity “as the product of ignorance and fear, as the enemy of intellectual progress and as prejudicial to true morality” (Volume VI, p. 2). According to Pierre Bayle, the problem of evil has never been solved. “For it is not possible to achieve any rational reconciliation of the evil in the world with the affirmation of an infinite, omniscient, and omnipotent God” (p. 7). M. de Voltaire held that God created the universe by necessity, and that “evil is inseparable from the world” (p. 21). If God created freely, he would be responsible for evil. For La Mettrie, a State composed of atheists “is not only possible but also desirable” (p. 48). Theism neither solves the problem of evil nor gives us a proper moral standard.

Third, Darwinists assert that science means a closed system of material causes and effects. That is simply what science is. Physics, chemistry, and biology all deal with physical objects. And, since the origin of life (and of the universe) probably involved these hard sciences, then we should expect to eventually have the capacity to explain the origin of life in terms of physics, chemistry, and biology, in terms of material causes and effects. Evolutionary creationist Deborah Haarsma says: “Science is good at figuring out physical mechanisms, but it is not equipped to address ultimate questions of God and meaning” (Four Views on Creation, Evolution, & Intelligent Design, p. 133). Evolution is the answer to origins because Darwinian macroevolution is intrinsically naturalistic, and Darwinian macroevolution is intrinsically naturalistic because any scientific theory should be naturalistic in content. God cannot be let in, for science “can never be influenced by anything outside of material nature” (Phillip Johnson, Objections Sustained, p. 22). Hypothetically, even if Darwinian macroevolution is weaker as a theory than Intelligent Design or Biblical creationism, that does not matter as long as the two latter theories remain non-materialistic. But, of course, ID and creationism are inherently non-materialistic, so they must be rejected. “This means that negative criticism of Darwinism, however devastating it may appear to be, is essentially irrelevant” (p. 25).

How should a Christian answer these critiques? To begin, blind nature only emulates an intelligent mind within very narrow limits, according to preprogrammed capacities. The only evidence Darwinists have for their theory of macroevolution is evidence that merely supports microevolution. Does natural selection happen? Yes. Do advantageous mutations happen? Yes. Do the fittest survive? Yes. But this is not evidence that the selection/mutation/survival mechanism on its own has the ability to produce sentient life, let alone rational & moral life. It is evidence that a brown bear can possibly, over time, become a polar bear, given certain environmental stresses. It is not evidence that a brown bear can possibly, over a longer period of time, become Mahatma Gandhi. A brown bear is not programmed to do that. Three things would need to happen: 1) The bear would need a heavy dose of new genetic information. 2) It would need a near impeccable series of advantageous mutations throughout its bloodline. 3) Changes would need to be small enough such that they wouldn’t kill the bear and its descendants. The selection/mutation mechanism can’t guarantee any of this. A purely material cause cannot supply new information; a steady series of advantageous mutations is mathematically impossible; and changes small enough to prevent embryonic lethals would never result in macroevolution. And “mutations that occur early in the developmental trajectory of an animal (from embryo to adult form) are inevitably lethal” (Theistic Evolution, p. 120). Substantive mutations kill the organism.

Furthermore, while I will say that Robert Wright’s Moral Animal contains a fair number of real insights into human nature, his most true insights are not necessarily tethered to Darwinian macroevolution. In other words, even if we do not understand our minds because natural selection hides it from us, even if we value social esteem because it helps us spread our genes, and even if we are a conflict between animal impulses and social commitments, none of this necessitates that we hold to a Darwinian worldview. After all, Darwinism is not the only philosophy that tells us things such as these. The human mind is unintelligible; see Jeremiah. “‘The heart is more deceitful than anything else, and incurable -- who can understand it?’” (17:9). We often value social esteem over real upright character; examine John. “Many did believe in him even among the rulers, but … they did not confess him, so that they would not be banned from the synagogue. For they loved human praise more than praise from God” (12:43). We are a conflict between wicked impulses and lawful precepts; observe Ecclesiastes. “‘I have discovered that God made people upright, but they pursued many schemes’” (7:29).

Moving on, the problem of evil, though difficult emotionally, is not that difficult intellectually. Some claim that pain and suffering do not square with a benevolent God. Why? Do pain and suffering not square with a benevolent father? No. C. S. Lewis reminds us that there would be no problem of pain unless we had “a good assurance that ultimate reality is righteous and loving,” just like we have assurance that the punishment of a good father comes from love (C. S. Lewis, Signature Classics, p. 558). A good father corrects his child when he or she does not conform to the moral standards the father has set, and this often causes pain (but purposeful pain nonetheless). Likewise, regarding God, “what seems to us good may therefore not be good in His eyes, and what seems to us evil may not be evil” (p. 567). And while it might be politically correct, it would be most unloving for God or a good father to sacrifice long term fulfillment for the sake of short term happiness. “Love, in its own nature, demands the perfecting of the beloved” (p. 573). A loving Father is intrinsically repelled by stains of character in those he loves.

But why is there so much suffering in general? Why is there so much death, disease, and depression? Well, the origin of this we find in Genesis: “‘The ground is cursed because of you. You will eat from it by means of painful labor all the days of your life. It will produce thorns and thistles for you, and you will eat the plants of the field’” (3:17, 18). Adam’s sin created a ripple effect throughout the created order, corrupting and distorting it. But then why are the good seemingly punished and the wicked seemingly rewarded? 1) One needs an objective standard of good and evil to make this objection, a standard which Wright and others admit that they don’t have. 2) One also needs a clear distinction between those who are good and those who are wicked. Jesus tells us that “‘No one is good except God alone’” (Luke 18:19). So, in one sense, the fact that any person receives blessings here on earth is a great mercy from God. Those who object to this don’t realize how wicked, by nature, we are: “the hearts of people are full of evil, and madness is in their hearts while they live” (Ecclesiastes 9:3). 3) Proverbs reminds us that the good are ultimately rewarded and the wicked ultimately punished. For if you pursue wisdom, “your days will be many, and years will be added to your life” (Proverbs 9:11). But for folly, “he doesn’t know that the departed spirits are there, that her guests are in the depths of Sheol” (9:18). This is an extremely cursory look at the problem of evil, but it should suffice for purposes of this essay.

Finally, science is less powerful and less clear-cut than many might assume. I would argue that if we define science as a comprehensive pursuit of truth, then we cannot restrict scientific investigation to merely material causes and effects. Darwinists must then concede that both Intelligent Design and Biblical creationism are legitimately scientific theories. But if we define science as the empirical observation and testing of the physical world, then it is justifiable to restrict scientific investigation along materialistic lines. Then, and here’s the crucial part, Darwinists must then admit that Darwinian macroevolution is not a scientific theory (and neither is Intelligent Design). But of course, that does not mean that the theory isn’t true. One problem with contemporary science is that we often assume that if it is scientific, it is true. But that’s as absurd as saying that if it is philosophical, it is true. Philosophy and science are simply fields of study for the pursuit of truth, not truth itself. I favor the second definition of science because it allows certain fields of study, such as philosophy and theology, to retain their proper role and scope. Darwinists like Wright, if they are honest, must hold to this second definition as well. We can hardly trust scientific discoveries if our minds have no particular fondness for truth: “Indeed, Darwinism comes close to calling into question the very meaning of the word truth” (Wright, p. 325). It seems Wright does not apply that debilitating skepticism to Darwinism itself. Even if Darwinism was scientific, that would not guarantee its truth. Science, according to my preferred definition, is probabilistic in nature. “Scientific theories are difficult, usually impossible, to logically prove because they make universal claims” (Theistic Evolution, p. 194). It is usually possible hypothetically that one outlier, whether a certain star or a certain animal, will disprove a scientific theory. So we should never give science an aura of infallibility.

There are some key applications from all of this. First, there is an immutable relationship between mind and information. Only intelligence can give meaning to matter. Moreover, there are certain things that matter alone cannot produce; thus there are certain things that science alone cannot explain. The example of Robert Wright tells us that we can accept truth from wherever it comes without fully accepting the worldview underlying those truth claims. Wright has some helpful insights on marriage and divorce, for example, but one does not have to be a Darwinist to see that. Regarding Darwin’s problem of pain, we can say that some things require pain to be perfected. This would include musical crafts, romantic relationships, and human beings themselves. Sufferings “produce many useful purposes; for they act as a penalty for sin and as a means of perfecting the good” (Volume IV, p. 328). And when we observe injustice and cruelty in the world, we should be much quicker to blame humanity than blame God. Lastly, perhaps relevant to all of this is the fact that we need not turn to scientific experts to answer our philosophical and theological questions. The deep mysteries surrounding the moral law, the origin of life, and the human conscience are not mysteries for science to solve anyway.

References

Christian Standard Bible. Nashville, TN: Holman Bible Publishers (2017).

Theistic Evolution: A Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Critique. Edited by J. P. Moreland, Stephen C. Meyer, Christopher Shaw, Ann K. Gauger, and Wayne Grudem. Crossway. Wheaton, IL (2017).

Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy: Volumes IV, V, VI, VIII. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. New York, NY (1960, 1959, 1960, 1963).

Ham, Ken; Ross, Hugh; Haarsma, Deborah B.; Meyer, Stephen C. Four Views on Creation, Evolution, and Intelligent Design. Edited by Stanley N. Gundry & J. B. Stump. Zondervan. Grand Rapids, MI (2017).

Johnson, Phillip E. Objections Sustained. InterVarsity Press. Downers Grove, IL (1998).

Lewis, C. S. The Problem of Pain (The C. S. Lewis Signature Classics). HarperCollins Publishers. New York, NY (2017).

Wright, Robert. The Moral Animal. Vintage Books. New York, NY (1995).