The Moral Law
God’s relation to moral norms has been one of the primary concerns of moral philosophy. Yet perspectives on this issue have varied widely. On the one hand, there are those who claim that God is bound by a moral law distinct from himself. On the other hand, there are those who argue that the moral law is freely determined by the will of God. Moreover, some believe the moral law is best explained by God and is sufficiently explained only if God is behind it, while others remove God from the picture entirely and hold that God is unnecessary for effective moral thinking. My aim is to analyze some of these perspectives and, if any of them prove true, to defend them. Because I am a Christian, I will be arguing from not only a philosophical basis, but also from a theological basis. Therefore, I hope to defend the moral framework that adheres to sound argument as well as to sacred Scripture. On my analysis, this moral framework is best found in the philosophies of both St. Augustine of Hippo and St. Thomas Aquinas, as we shall see. But, I shall show that even thinkers with which I disagree shed light on important issues regarding the moral law and how God relates to it.
The famous Euthyphro Dilemma gives us a good place to start. Plato’s Euthyphro hinges on a question central to this paper: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” (Plato, p. 130). While Euthyphro attempts to resolve the dilemma, he, in the end, claims that “what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious” (p. 128). What are the implications of this? Well, hypothetically God could command anything and it would be morally right because all that matters is whether God wills it. For instance, by this reasoning, the commands against murder and adultery in the Ten Commandments are morally right solely because God wills it so. This seems to be a precarious position. Is there an alternative? We can assume instead that God adheres to certain principles because they are right. Is there anything wrong with this? Potentially. If God adheres to moral principles outside himself, is he really the ultimate authority? Is he truly sovereign? A sober-minded theist may tremble a bit at this dilemma. Neither of these positions appear to be satisfactory. However, while the Euthyphro Dilemma is perhaps an important concept to wrestle with, it does not circumscribe the nature of morality and how it relates to God. For instance, there is a substantive difference between the will of God and the character of God. This will be developed soon. For now, let’s look in more detail at Plato’s moral philosophy.
Ethics, according to Plato, “is directed toward the attainment of man’s highest good, in the possession of which true happiness consists” (Copleston, Volume I, p. 216). For Plato, man’s happiness and the Good are inseparably linked. This notion is promoted by the psalmist as well. “Light is sown for the righteous, and joy for the upright in heart” (Psalm 97:11). The attainment of the highest good, at a basic level, entails the development of one’s soul, moral personality, and general well-being. Indeed, for Plato, man’s happiness involves knowledge of and reflection of God. Thus, since the source of man’s happiness is equivalent to man’s highest good, it readily follows that God is the Good in Plato’s philosophy. “Plato declares that ‘God is the measure of all things, in a sense far higher than any man, as they say, can ever hope to be’” (Volume I, p. 218, Laws). What does “God” mean for Plato though? Well, “atheism,” is the denial of “the operation of Reason in the world” (Volume I, p. 191, Timaeus). So it seems reasonable to claim that “God” is equivalent to some form of “Divine Reason.” But, it cannot be confidently asserted that, for Plato, the Forms inhere the Divine Reason. Why is this important? Because the preeminent Form is the Form of the Good.
Thus, it is apparent that, in Plato’s philosophy, a moral law exists outside of God. For him, God loves certain things and is a certain way because he adheres to a moral law (i.e. the Forms) outside himself. If this interpretation is correct, then it is arguably at odds with a biblical notion of God’s sovereignty and and at odds with verses in Scripture that imply God’s very character and essence to be the source of truth and goodness. “Jesus said to him, ‘I am the way, and the truth, and the life’” (John 14:6). “But the Lord is the true God; he is the living God and the everlasting King” (Jer. 10:10). “‘But when the Helper comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father, he will bear witness about me’” (John 15:26). “And we know that the Son of God has come and has given us understanding, so that we may know him who is true; and we are in him who is true, in his Son Jesus Christ. He is the true God and eternal life” (1 John 5:20). “The sum of your word is truth, and every one of your righteous rules endures forever” (Psalm 119:160).
St. Augustine, although himself a Neo-Platonist, differs from Plato on the issue of God and the moral law. Like Plato, Augustine argues that ultimate happiness “can be found only in the possession of the immutable Good, God” (Copleston, Volume II, p. 83). “Let your priests, O Lord God, be clothed with salvation, and let your saints rejoice in your goodness” (2 Chr. 6:41). However, Augustine also holds that the eternal law of God is by no means an arbitrary set of principles but rather a moral law founded on “the Nature of God and the relationship of man to God” (II, p. 83). St. Aquinas similarly claims that the moral law is “ultimately founded on the divine essence itself and so cannot change” (II, p. 410). This is also true of the natural law, which is derived from the moral law. The natural law is rooted in human nature so “it follows that it cannot be changed, since human nature remains fundamentally the same” (II, p. 407, Theologiae). From this, we can conclude that the moral law is not separate from God. This answers the first clause of the Euthyphro Dilemma. Additionally, God wills the moral law, but not arbitrarily, because his will is consistent with his character, which cannot change. This answers the second clause. Thus, we see that an emphasis on God’s character as the source of the moral law provides a ready solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma. Moreover, both Augustine’s and Aquinas’ beliefs in this regard are clearly aligned with Scripture. “The law of the Lord is perfect, reviving the soul … the precepts of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart … the rules of the Lord are true, and righteous altogether” (Psalm 19:7, 8, 9).
Two other medieval philosophers give us an alternative to the Augustinian and Thomistic perspectives. John Duns Scotus asserts that the moral law is founded on the will of God rather than the essence of God. But Scotus would add that “what God wills is good because God of His very nature cannot will anything but what is good” (Copleston, Volume II, p. 547). Scotus essentially claims that while the moral law is dependent on God’s will alone, we can be sure that God will not command anything evil because his nature precludes it. To a skeptic, this may seem like a weak escape from the Euthyphro Dilemma. William of Ockham went even further than Scotus. Ockham argues that the entire moral law is “wholly contingent … its essence and character depend on the divine creative and omnipotent will” (Copleston, Volume III, p. 104). The moral law is ultimately derived solely from God’s will, not his character. The result of this is that while God currently forbids adultery, adultery would become a right action if it were commanded by God. Thus, the general principle of Ockham’s moral thought is that some actions are evil because they are forbidden by God. This moral philosophy easily, if inadvertently, sets up the notion of an arbitrary God. Ockham’s moral philosophy seems to fall prey to the Euthyphro Dilemma because of its singular focus on the divine will rather than the divine essence. While Scotus gave a caveat to the freedom of God’s will, Ockham does no such thing. But what we see in Scripture is an unchanging expression of what is good and what is evil. “Beloved, do not imitate evil but imitate good. Whoever does good is from God; whoever does evil has not seen God” (3 John 1:11). “For I the Lord do not change” (Mal. 3:6).
Robert Adams offers a moral framework similar to that of Scotus, but in contemporary fashion. As a divine command theorist, Adams holds that the nature of morality is intrinsically tied to the will or commands of God. Consequently, if an action is wrong, this means that it is contrary to the commands of God. And if an action is obligatory, this implies that it is required by the commands of God. But Adams adds the caveat that these commands do not derive from an arbitrary God but from a loving God. “It is allowed by the theory to be logically possible for God to command cruelty for its own sake, although the believer is confident he will not do such a thing” (Adams, p. 135). But like Scotus’ framework, Adams’ moral framework does not appear to answer the Euthyphro Dilemma in a satisfactory way. Adams’ argument, one may object, essentially comes down to “God is not arbitrary because God is not arbitrary (because he’s loving).” Adams assumes that God is loving. This is an assertion with obvious scriptural warrant. But it is an assertion that doesn’t necessarily follow from his moral framework. Nevertheless, it is consistent with Scripture both that the commands of God are right and that God is loving. “Through your precepts I get understanding” (Psalm 119:104). “Beloved, let us love one another, for love is from God” (1 John 4:21).
I have briefly shown both the weakness of the Euthyphro Dilemma in expressing all there is to God and morality and the vulnerability of theistic moral frameworks that might fall prey to this dilemma. So, understandably, Kai Nielsen, an avowed atheist, draws ammunition from the Euthyphro Dilemma in his critique of theistic morality. Nielsen’s stance is clear: “There is no evidence whatsoever for the existence of God” (Nielsen, p. 100). Moreover, he has two main lines of attack directed at theistic morality. The first concerns authority. Nielsen presupposes early on that “if we do what we do simply because it has been authorized, we cannot be reasoning and acting as moral agents” (p. 53). Instead, we should autonomously establish our own moral principles and support these principles clearly and rationally. Nielsen argues that “simple commands or imperatives” (p. 74) do not necessarily lead to legitimate moral obligations. For example, a professor commanding a student to complete an assignment does not make the completion of an assignment a right act. In this sense, Nielsen is right. Simple commands or imperatives do not automatically lead to moral obligations. But the commands that issue from the mouth of a holy, righteous, and sovereign God cannot be called simple by any means. “By myself I have sworn; from my mouth has gone out in righteousness a word that shall not return: ‘To me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear allegiance’” (Isaiah 45:23). Furthermore, it must be said that commands that issue from fallen, imperfect, contingent human beings have next to no weight in comparison. The examples Nielsen gives do not do justice to the question. At the same time, however, Nielsen does pinpoint some of the flaws with an Adamsist or Ockhamist viewpoint that we’ve seen. Authority alone is not necessarily a reason to do something, particularly if said authority is not morally good. Yet true Christians realize that the divine authority whom we worship is morally good.
The second line of attack concerns the relation between morality and religion. Nielsen rightly ascertains that if the moral law is independent from God, then we do not need God for the moral law to be intelligible to us. In other words, God would judge his actions in accordance with the moral law just as we would. From this, Nielsen asserts that “we must … use our own moral insight to decide that God’s acts are good. … We cannot avoid using our own moral understanding … if we are ever to know that God is good” (p. 75). There is some truth here, but it is far from a slam dunk. First, the very moral insight we use to judge acts as right or wrong comes from God, for we are made in his image. “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them” (Gen. 1:27). What’s more, it is not as if God is utterly concealed until one reads Scripture. The Apostle Paul tells us that “his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world” (Rom. 1:20). Finally, God and his Word are in authority over us, not the opposite. As unholy creatures, we do not have the right to tell God where or when he could have done better. “But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, ‘Why have you made me like this?’” (Romans 9:20). Thus, while Nielsen says that “morality does not presuppose religion; religion presupposes morality” (p. 77), I would counter that the morality we use to presuppose religion itself has a religious significance since we, as human beings, image God.
Ultimately, Nielsen fails to engage with any Augustinian or Thomist perspective on God and his relation to the moral law. This proves to be his key weakness. If one considers the foundation of morality in light of God’s character, much of what Nielsen says simply falls apart; for he predominantly concerns himself, very broadly speaking, with the Platonist and Ockhamist moral frameworks, which have been shown to be vulnerable to criticism. What is Nielsen’s alternative then? He promotes the idea that “the overall rationale of moral rules is linked to achieving the maximum in human happiness and the minimum in human suffering” (p. 94). Why? According to a Christian worldview, human happiness certainly is valuable. But why should it be in a secular worldview? Especially a secular worldview like Nielsen’s who holds that “man was not made for anything” (p. 103). While I concede to Nielsen that it is very possible for secular people to be moral people (indeed, we rely on this to be the case when going about our everyday activities), the secular worldview in this case, or any case, lacks a sufficient basis to be moral.
I now turn to our final thinker for consideration: Mark C. Murphy. Murphy puts forward a moral framework called “moral concurrentism,” which says that “moral necessitation, and thus moral law, is immediately explained both by God and by creaturely natures” (Murphy, p. 148). Murphy frequently refers to Robert Adams as a fair starting point for a theistic moral framework, but he notes weak spots in Adams’ ideas. Murphy argues that Adams is right in claiming that “the goodness of creaturely goods consists in their resemblance to God” (p. 150), but adds that a thing’s excellence should not be solely determined by its resemblance to God but also by its “resemblance to … the kind to which the thing belongs” (p. 154). For example, Murphy humorously demonstrates that it is not good for the nature of a human being to taste “like a well-prepared chicken fried steak” (p. 159). This gets at the will vs. character issue I’ve continued to raise. It is not unlike Augustine’s accent on the essence of God and his relationship to us as the basis for the moral law. We follow God’s commands but not for the sake of following a hypothetically arbitrary deity’s precepts, but rather because we fear and love a God with a morally perfect nature, a God who we reflect due to our own nature.
Murphy develops his ideas on moral obligation and necessitation in light of the nature of God and man. “God alone is good without qualification” (p. 162), Murphy argues, but many things participate in the goodness of God. So, these lesser goods still “demand a response as participations in the divine goodness” (p. 162). This provides the foundation for moral obligation. For instance, humankind, made in God’s image, participates in God’s goodness and consequently has intrinsic moral worth. From these, moral principles such as “Murder is wrong” may easily follow. Murphy emphasizes that the goodness of the created order should not be “contrasted to the divine goodness” (165). Instead, love and benevolence shown toward creatures should, by extension, be seen to fundamentally be love and benevolence shown toward the Creator. Understandably then, Murphy, like Nielsen, maintains that raw authority may not intrinsically give a “decisive reason to perform [an] action” (p. 168). In other words, God commanding an action does not give us a good reason to do that action if God is not the source of moral goodness but is actually morally evil. But again, Christians realize that God is unable, by his very nature, to commit moral evil. “The Rock, his work is perfect, for all his ways are justice. A God of faithfulness and without iniquity, just and upright is he” (Deut. 32:4).
At this point, one may object that the solutions offered by Augustine, Aquinas, and Murphy possibly leave a critical problem unsolved. What is this problem? It is the second order Euthyphro Dilemma. Up until now, most of our attention has been focused on the first order dilemma. The second order dilemma asks this question: is God’s nature good because it is God’s nature or is God’s nature good because it adheres to some other standard? Two things may be said here. 1) God is the highest, most perfect, most holy standard for all creation. “For thus says the One who is high and lifted up, who inhabits eternity, whose name is Holy: ‘I dwell in the high and holy place’” (Is. 57:15). “‘Who is like you, majestic in holiness, awesome in glorious deeds, doing wonders?’” (Ex. 15:11). “‘There is none holy like the Lord; there is none besides you; there is no rock like our God’” (1 Sam. 2:2). Scripture plainly precludes the possibility of any standard of perfection outside the great “I AM” (Ex. 3:14). 2) Creation’s understanding of what is good is founded on who God is. “And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good” (Gen. 1:31). Knowledge of God is linked to knowledge of goodness. “The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God.’ They are corrupt … there is none who does good” (Psalm 14:1). “I say to the Lord, ‘You are my Lord; I have no good apart from you’” (Psalm 16:2). “You are good and do good; teach me your statutes” (Psalm 119:68). Therefore, as creatures of a benevolent and powerful God, we depend on him for our comprehension of all things, including the moral law. All we can rightfully do is “tremble at the commandment of our God” (Ezra 10:3).
So, what have we learned? We began with the Euthyphro Dilemma for the question it raises bears weight on several of the moral frameworks presented here. But, I have argued that the Dilemma really does not get at the heart of the issue of how God relates to the moral law, and it can be further argued that it puts forth an unbiblical dichotomy. This is because it is Scripturally sound both that 1) God commands us to do certain actions and have certain attitudes because they are right and that 2) the commands of God are themselves right. “I hasten and do not delay to keep your commandments. … At midnight I rise to praise you, because of your righteous rules” (Psalm 119:60, 62). It can further be said that even though the moral frameworks of Scotus and Ockham may have startling implications, Ockham’s goal especially was to “emphasize the divine omnipotence and liberty, not to encourage immorality” (Copleston, Volume III, p. 105). Moreover, even if one thinks that the Euthyphro Dilemma deserves a thorough answer, I have shown that a focus on God’s holy, righteous character provides that answer. In addition, it provides a rebuttal to Nielsen’s critique of theistic morality. This solution, the stress on the character of God, is held most vigorously and persuasively by two titans of Christian theology and philosophy: Augustine and Aquinas. But you see very similar thinking in the words of Mark C. Murphy. Therefore, while many philosophers have put forth defensible views on the relation between God and the moral law, it seems that those who have maintained the best views on the issue are firmly grounded in sound philosophical reasoning and in wise biblical exegesis. They are those who “ascribe to the Lord the glory due his name” (Psalm 29:2).
References
English Standard Version. Wheaton, IL: Crossway (2001).
Adams, Robert M. “A New Divine Command Theory.” Journal of Religious Ethics (Spring 1979). Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory. Edited by Sher, George. New York, NY: Routledge (2012).
Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy: Volumes I, Volume II, Volume III. Westminster, MD: The Newman Press (1946, 1950, 1953).
Murphy, Mark C. God & Moral Law. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (2011).
Nielsen, Kai. Ethics Without God: Revised Edition. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books (1990).
Plato. Euthyphro. Translated by G.M.A. Grube. Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory. Edited by Sher, George. New York, NY: Routledge (2012).
