Darwinian Macroevolution

The theory of Darwinian macroevolution, the idea that natural selection and random mutation produced contemporary biodiversity, is a theory high on philosophical speculation and low on empirical evidence. Darwinists disagree of course. They say, among other things, that nature does not need a guiding hand, that nature can self-organize itself. They hold that the suffering and misery of this world provide an insurmountable obstacle to a belief in an intelligently designed universe sustained by the providence of God. They further hold that Darwinism is so far the best explanation for life’s origins and development that remains scientific. But this philosophy is erroneous and misguided. Blind nature cannot self-organize anything; if the blind lead the blind, they fall into a pit. Suffering and misery can be readily defined and explained in a theistic worldview. Moreover, the path of science and the path of truth do not always intersect. Darwinism is a weak worldview, but to present it in its best light, I will first describe what may be some of the more challenging arguments in favor of Darwinian macroevolution. Then, I will dissolve these arguments with good thinking and biblical reasoning. Let’s begin.

First, Darwinists claim that nature can have the same effect on an organism as the intentional decisions of an intelligent agent. This is perhaps the crux of Darwinian macroevolutionary theory. If nature cannot have the same effect as the decisions of a mind, then Darwinism loses a great deal of credibility. Jean-Baptiste Pierre Lamarck argues that “in response to new needs brought about by changes in the environment, changes take place in the organic structure of animals, some organs falling into disuse and others being evolved and developed, and that acquired habits are transmitted by heredity” (Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Volume VIII, p. 101). The wolves and bears of the world, for example, are made more adaptable to colder, snowier environments by changes in their fur color and density. Upon reading Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population, Charles Darwin similarly concludes that advantageous mutations are preserved, disadvantageous mutations are destroyed, and “that the result of this process is the formation of new species” (p. 102). But this is not controversial. Alfred Russell Wallace is also sympathetic to the “idea of the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence” (p. 102). Yet this still only gets us to microevolution; no one denies that fitter organisms survive, that fitter organisms succeed. What is controversial about Darwinism is that it asserts that the mutation/selection mechanism drove the history of life, not just speciation.

But is the history of life better explained by matter than by mind? Is Darwinism the best explanation for how the world works? Robert Wright certainly thinks so. One example is the concept of a universal human nature. “Darwinian anthropologists see the world’s undeniably diverse cultures as products of a single human nature responding to widely varying circumstances” (Robert Wright, The Moral Animal, p. 8). In Darwinian terms, we all possess the same human nature because we all originated from the same human ancestors, who in turn originated from a similar group of pre-human organisms, and so on. And the obvious differences we see between cultures and peoples can be attributed to environmental factors. Moreover, the reason we do not fully understand our minds is because natural selection “appears to have hidden our true selves from our conscious selves” (p. 10). And all those warm moral terms like compassion, empathy, and love actually have no eternal or metaphysical basis, but merely “a firm genetic basis” (p. 12). Indeed, Wright goes so far as to say that Darwinian macroevolutionary theory “is so powerful as to explain the nature of all living things” (p. 14). Sociologically speaking, Wright claims that the reason we seek status, value social esteem, and aim to be morally reputable and self-sufficient is that it helps us spread our genes (p. 313). “Genetic proliferation” is the ultimate end of all life (p. 317). The reason we are a “conflict between animal impulses” and social commitments is because we are actually animals with better developed social reasoning (p. 321). Thus, Darwinism would then explain anthropology, psychology, and sociology rather handily. But, of course, just because a theory can explain a certain set of data to a certain degree of satisfaction does not mean that it is the true explanation for that data.

Second, Darwinists argue that pain, suffering, and inefficiency do not square with a benevolent God. In Darwin’s eyes, “he [can] see no evidence of design, still less of beneficent design, when he [comes] to consider the details of natural history” (Copleston, Volume VIII, p. 103). In this context, Darwin’s objection is against Intelligent Design. But his statement broadly regards the problem of evil, which is often an objection against theism entirely (as demonstrated by Darwin’s agnosticism in later life). The problem is not new; it is discussed as early as Job: “Why is light given to one burdened with grief, and life to those whose existence is bitter, who wait for death, but it does not come” (3:20). Or Ecclesiastes: “There are righteous people who get what the actions of the wicked deserve, and there are wicked people who get what the actions of the righteous deserve” (8:14). Thus, the problem of evil seems to have two main prongs: 1) Why is there so much suffering in general? 2) Why are the good punished and the wicked rewarded? Wright draws attention to this toward the end of his book. “If God were benevolent and truly omnipotent, why couldn’t he invent a painless creative process?” (Wright, p. 331). He rejects the idea of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God for he later writes: “in a universe which for all we know is godless, one reasonable place to find moral guidance is utilitarianism” (p. 332).

Permutations of the problem of evil can be found throughout the history of philosophy. British philosopher David Hume “thought that religion impairs morality by encouraging people to act for motives other than love of virtue for its own sake” (Copleston, Volume V, p. 305). In other words, not only is evil inexplicable in a theistic universe, much evil is brought about by those who believe in a theistic universe. Indeed, some representatives of the French Enlightenment regarded Christianity “as the product of ignorance and fear, as the enemy of intellectual progress and as prejudicial to true morality” (Volume VI, p. 2). According to Pierre Bayle, the problem of evil has never been solved. “For it is not possible to achieve any rational reconciliation of the evil in the world with the affirmation of an infinite, omniscient, and omnipotent God” (p. 7). M. de Voltaire held that God created the universe by necessity, and that “evil is inseparable from the world” (p. 21). If God created freely, he would be responsible for evil. For La Mettrie, a State composed of atheists “is not only possible but also desirable” (p. 48). Theism neither solves the problem of evil nor gives us a proper moral standard.

Third, Darwinists assert that science means a closed system of material causes and effects. That is simply what science is. Physics, chemistry, and biology all deal with physical objects. And, since the origin of life (and of the universe) probably involved these hard sciences, then we should expect to eventually have the capacity to explain the origin of life in terms of physics, chemistry, and biology, in terms of material causes and effects. Evolutionary creationist Deborah Haarsma says: “Science is good at figuring out physical mechanisms, but it is not equipped to address ultimate questions of God and meaning” (Four Views on Creation, Evolution, & Intelligent Design, p. 133). Evolution is the answer to origins because Darwinian macroevolution is intrinsically naturalistic, and Darwinian macroevolution is intrinsically naturalistic because any scientific theory should be naturalistic in content. God cannot be let in, for science “can never be influenced by anything outside of material nature” (Phillip Johnson, Objections Sustained, p. 22). Hypothetically, even if Darwinian macroevolution is weaker as a theory than Intelligent Design or Biblical creationism, that does not matter as long as the two latter theories remain non-materialistic. But, of course, ID and creationism are inherently non-materialistic, so they must be rejected. “This means that negative criticism of Darwinism, however devastating it may appear to be, is essentially irrelevant” (p. 25).

How should a Christian answer these critiques? To begin, blind nature only emulates an intelligent mind within very narrow limits, according to preprogrammed capacities. The only evidence Darwinists have for their theory of macroevolution is evidence that merely supports microevolution. Does natural selection happen? Yes. Do advantageous mutations happen? Yes. Do the fittest survive? Yes. But this is not evidence that the selection/mutation/survival mechanism on its own has the ability to produce sentient life, let alone rational & moral life. It is evidence that a brown bear can possibly, over time, become a polar bear, given certain environmental stresses. It is not evidence that a brown bear can possibly, over a longer period of time, become Mahatma Gandhi. A brown bear is not programmed to do that. Three things would need to happen: 1) The bear would need a heavy dose of new genetic information. 2) It would need a near impeccable series of advantageous mutations throughout its bloodline. 3) Changes would need to be small enough such that they wouldn’t kill the bear and its descendants. The selection/mutation mechanism can’t guarantee any of this. A purely material cause cannot supply new information; a steady series of advantageous mutations is mathematically impossible; and changes small enough to prevent embryonic lethals would never result in macroevolution. And “mutations that occur early in the developmental trajectory of an animal (from embryo to adult form) are inevitably lethal” (Theistic Evolution, p. 120). Substantive mutations kill the organism.

Furthermore, while I will say that Robert Wright’s Moral Animal contains a fair number of real insights into human nature, his most true insights are not necessarily tethered to Darwinian macroevolution. In other words, even if we do not understand our minds because natural selection hides it from us, even if we value social esteem because it helps us spread our genes, and even if we are a conflict between animal impulses and social commitments, none of this necessitates that we hold to a Darwinian worldview. After all, Darwinism is not the only philosophy that tells us things such as these. The human mind is unintelligible; see Jeremiah. “‘The heart is more deceitful than anything else, and incurable -- who can understand it?’” (17:9). We often value social esteem over real upright character; examine John. “Many did believe in him even among the rulers, but … they did not confess him, so that they would not be banned from the synagogue. For they loved human praise more than praise from God” (12:43). We are a conflict between wicked impulses and lawful precepts; observe Ecclesiastes. “‘I have discovered that God made people upright, but they pursued many schemes’” (7:29).

Moving on, the problem of evil, though difficult emotionally, is not that difficult intellectually. Some claim that pain and suffering do not square with a benevolent God. Why? Do pain and suffering not square with a benevolent father? No. C. S. Lewis reminds us that there would be no problem of pain unless we had “a good assurance that ultimate reality is righteous and loving,” just like we have assurance that the punishment of a good father comes from love (C. S. Lewis, Signature Classics, p. 558). A good father corrects his child when he or she does not conform to the moral standards the father has set, and this often causes pain (but purposeful pain nonetheless). Likewise, regarding God, “what seems to us good may therefore not be good in His eyes, and what seems to us evil may not be evil” (p. 567). And while it might be politically correct, it would be most unloving for God or a good father to sacrifice long term fulfillment for the sake of short term happiness. “Love, in its own nature, demands the perfecting of the beloved” (p. 573). A loving Father is intrinsically repelled by stains of character in those he loves.

But why is there so much suffering in general? Why is there so much death, disease, and depression? Well, the origin of this we find in Genesis: “‘The ground is cursed because of you. You will eat from it by means of painful labor all the days of your life. It will produce thorns and thistles for you, and you will eat the plants of the field’” (3:17, 18). Adam’s sin created a ripple effect throughout the created order, corrupting and distorting it. But then why are the good seemingly punished and the wicked seemingly rewarded? 1) One needs an objective standard of good and evil to make this objection, a standard which Wright and others admit that they don’t have. 2) One also needs a clear distinction between those who are good and those who are wicked. Jesus tells us that “‘No one is good except God alone’” (Luke 18:19). So, in one sense, the fact that any person receives blessings here on earth is a great mercy from God. Those who object to this don’t realize how wicked, by nature, we are: “the hearts of people are full of evil, and madness is in their hearts while they live” (Ecclesiastes 9:3). 3) Proverbs reminds us that the good are ultimately rewarded and the wicked ultimately punished. For if you pursue wisdom, “your days will be many, and years will be added to your life” (Proverbs 9:11). But for folly, “he doesn’t know that the departed spirits are there, that her guests are in the depths of Sheol” (9:18). This is an extremely cursory look at the problem of evil, but it should suffice for purposes of this essay.

Finally, science is less powerful and less clear-cut than many might assume. I would argue that if we define science as a comprehensive pursuit of truth, then we cannot restrict scientific investigation to merely material causes and effects. Darwinists must then concede that both Intelligent Design and Biblical creationism are legitimately scientific theories. But if we define science as the empirical observation and testing of the physical world, then it is justifiable to restrict scientific investigation along materialistic lines. Then, and here’s the crucial part, Darwinists must then admit that Darwinian macroevolution is not a scientific theory (and neither is Intelligent Design). But of course, that does not mean that the theory isn’t true. One problem with contemporary science is that we often assume that if it is scientific, it is true. But that’s as absurd as saying that if it is philosophical, it is true. Philosophy and science are simply fields of study for the pursuit of truth, not truth itself. I favor the second definition of science because it allows certain fields of study, such as philosophy and theology, to retain their proper role and scope. Darwinists like Wright, if they are honest, must hold to this second definition as well. We can hardly trust scientific discoveries if our minds have no particular fondness for truth: “Indeed, Darwinism comes close to calling into question the very meaning of the word truth” (Wright, p. 325). It seems Wright does not apply that debilitating skepticism to Darwinism itself. Even if Darwinism was scientific, that would not guarantee its truth. Science, according to my preferred definition, is probabilistic in nature. “Scientific theories are difficult, usually impossible, to logically prove because they make universal claims” (Theistic Evolution, p. 194). It is usually possible hypothetically that one outlier, whether a certain star or a certain animal, will disprove a scientific theory. So we should never give science an aura of infallibility.

There are some key applications from all of this. First, there is an immutable relationship between mind and information. Only intelligence can give meaning to matter. Moreover, there are certain things that matter alone cannot produce; thus there are certain things that science alone cannot explain. The example of Robert Wright tells us that we can accept truth from wherever it comes without fully accepting the worldview underlying those truth claims. Wright has some helpful insights on marriage and divorce, for example, but one does not have to be a Darwinist to see that. Regarding Darwin’s problem of pain, we can say that some things require pain to be perfected. This would include musical crafts, romantic relationships, and human beings themselves. Sufferings “produce many useful purposes; for they act as a penalty for sin and as a means of perfecting the good” (Volume IV, p. 328). And when we observe injustice and cruelty in the world, we should be much quicker to blame humanity than blame God. Lastly, perhaps relevant to all of this is the fact that we need not turn to scientific experts to answer our philosophical and theological questions. The deep mysteries surrounding the moral law, the origin of life, and the human conscience are not mysteries for science to solve anyway.

References

Christian Standard Bible. Nashville, TN: Holman Bible Publishers (2017).

Theistic Evolution: A Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Critique. Edited by J. P. Moreland, Stephen C. Meyer, Christopher Shaw, Ann K. Gauger, and Wayne Grudem. Crossway. Wheaton, IL (2017).

Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy: Volumes IV, V, VI, VIII. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. New York, NY (1960, 1959, 1960, 1963).

Ham, Ken; Ross, Hugh; Haarsma, Deborah B.; Meyer, Stephen C. Four Views on Creation, Evolution, and Intelligent Design. Edited by Stanley N. Gundry & J. B. Stump. Zondervan. Grand Rapids, MI (2017).

Johnson, Phillip E. Objections Sustained. InterVarsity Press. Downers Grove, IL (1998).

Lewis, C. S. The Problem of Pain (The C. S. Lewis Signature Classics). HarperCollins Publishers. New York, NY (2017).

Wright, Robert. The Moral Animal. Vintage Books. New York, NY (1995).